

〈講演〉

Controlling Latin American Migration to Industrialized Countries: The U.S. and Japanese Experiences¹⁾

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INTRODUCTION

As a newcomer to studies of contemporary Japan, I was deeply honored to be invited by your President, Professor Mutsuo Yamada, to make this presentation to the members of JALAS on a topic that is of growing interest to Latin Americanists in both Japan and the United States.

U.S.-based Latin Americanists can no longer limit their attention to developments within Latin America and government-to-government relations between the United States and Latin American countries. The Latin American poor and, increasingly, the middle classes have “voted with their feet” against deteriorating economic and social conditions and limited opportunities in their home countries. As a consequence, the Latin Americanization of the U.S. population has gained great momentum.

There are some potentially valuable lessons that might be learned by Japan, at this comparatively early stage of its becoming a country of immigration, from the much longer experience of the United States in

dealing with Third World immigration flows. Most these lessons are negative ones — governmental and general-public responses that are to be avoided, not emulated, if at all possible.

At this historical juncture, Japan has the luxury of time: time to fashion an immigration policy that responds to its national interests and public concerns, but is also *realistic* and therefore sustainable. By “realistic,” I mean a national immigration policy that is based on an objective understanding of Japan’s demographic and labor-market trends and its requirements for future economic growth; one that recognizes the strength of “push” factors in the principal labor-exporting countries that now send workers to Japan; and a policy that is consistent with the social dynamics of the international migration process itself, which inevitably creates transnational family and employer-worker networks that eventually become self-sustaining and are progressively more difficult for governments to manipulate. The basic goal of such a policy would be to facilitate Japan’s transformation into a more open, internationalized, multiethnic *country* — not just to provide an internationalized *work force* to fuel the country’s economy.

The Japanese are recognized throughout the world as a pragmatic people, whose behavior is not circumscribed by rigid ideological conceptions or commitments to particular public policies. This well-deserved reputation for pragmatism will be put to perhaps its severest test during the next ten to fifteen years, as Japan struggles through the shift from an essentially zero-immigration country to one in which there will be a substantial foreign-worker presence in certain sectors of the economy, in certain regions, cities, and neighborhoods.

Whether or not Japan will ever publicly declare itself to be a “country of immigration” — i. e., a country that actively encourages or at least

tolerates large-scale foreign immigration — is less important. The real issue, as it is in the United States and Western Europe today, is whether foreign workers and their offspring can be incorporated, more or less permanently, into the society and economy, on terms that are most beneficial for both the immigrants themselves and the host country, without generating excessive levels of social tension and political conflict.

LATIN AMERICAN MIGRATION TO JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

The conditions under which Latin American migration to Japan and to the United States has been occurring in recent years are vastly different. In the Japanese case, immigration from Latin America is still under tight government control, even though there may be a growing problem of entries by “false Nikkeijin” whose Japanese ancestry is not genuine but rather the product of fraudulent document-makers, operating in league with commercial travel agencies and professional people-smuggling rings²⁾. In Japan, there is no problem of clandestine entry from Latin America.

By contrast, Latin American migration to the United States is predominantly clandestine, even though Latin American and Caribbean migrants also constitute two-thirds of the immigrants who are admitted *legally* to the U.S. each year. During the 1992 fiscal year, 1,258,482 apprehensions of illegal aliens were made by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; 96 percent of those apprehensions involved Mexicans. Even after the 1986 amnesty programs, which regularized the status of more than 3.1 million illegal immigrants, the permanent stock of illegal immigrants living in the U.S. is estimated

by most experts at somewhere between 3 and 4 million, the vast majority of them from Mexico and other Latin American and Caribbean countries. According to the most reliable estimates, the stock of illegals, of all nationalities, is growing at a rate of about 150,000 per year.

While the influx of Nikkeijin from Latin America into Japan has been rapid since 1989, it is clear that, unlike the United States, Japan does not have a virtually unlimited reservoir of Latin American labor from which to draw — at least if legal entry continues to be restricted to Latin Americans of *Japanese ancestry*. According to a census conducted by the Japanese communities in Brazil, the number of Japanese descendants living in that country as of 1986-1988 (the census period) was 1,228,000³⁾. Estimates by the Japanese government put the figure at 1,280,000, of whom 131,000 — more than ten percent — were already in Japan by 1992. According to some unofficial estimates, as many as 160,000 Brazilian Nikkeijin were living in Japan in the same year, while a total of 200,000-250,000 had made at least one trip to Japan since the mid-1980s⁴⁾. In Peru, the potential labor recruitment pool of Nikkeijin is just 80,000, of whom 30,400 (38 percent) were estimated to be in Japan by 1992⁵⁾. Argentina has an estimated 30,000 Japanese emigres and descendants; Paraguay, 7,000; and Bolivia, 6,000. A few Japanese academics believe that the total number of Brazilian Nikkeijin working in Japan could eventually rise to nearly half a million, which would represent 39 percent of the theoretically available pool. However, that is an “upper-end” estimate; most others are considerably lower. In short, the importation of Japanese-Latin American workers is a time-limited policy, that will probably be exhausted by the end of the current decade.

STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON LATIN AMERICAN LABOR

It has been apparent for at least two decades that some sectors of the U.S. economy have become structurally dependent on immigrant labor to fill low-paying, low-skill jobs⁶⁾. Despite numerous advances in mechanization, seasonal agriculture in the state of California, for example, is just as dependent on farmworkers from Mexico today as it was a generation ago. In the urban sector, especially in the U.S. Southwest and major cities of the Mid-West (Chicago) and the East (New York, Washington, Miami), the construction, service, retail, and light manufacturing industries have come to rely increasingly on Mexican and other Latin American and Caribbean immigrants to fill what in Japan would be called “3-K” jobs in Japan (i.e., *kitanai*, *kitsui*, *kiken* — dirty, physically demanding, and often dangerous jobs). Their function in the U.S. economy is not just to fill voids in the labor market that have been created by the exit or unavailability of U.S.-born workers, but to serve as “shock absorbers,” especially for small and medium-sized businesses, enabling them to shed labor rapidly and easily during recessions and to increase production rapidly during expansionary periods.

In Japan, the Latin American Nikkeijin have also become a fixture in various kinds of manufacturing industry (especially auto parts) during the past four years. Like Mexicans in the United States, they tend to be highly valued by their employers for their strong work ethic and their reliability, especially by comparison with young Japanese who detest doing the kinds of work performed by the Nikkeijin. Some employers also prefer the Latin American Nikkeijin over foreign workers from Asian countries (e.g., Chinese admitted for “company

trainee" programs). The Nikkeijin's limited competence in the Japanese language tends to be overlooked or at most, treated as a temporary hindrance, even in high-technology industries. For example, Kasumi Manufacturing, a computer parts manufacturer, has one factory that is operated solely by six Nikkeijin; Japanese supervisors only visit the plant for occasional, routine inspections⁷). In other firms, Nikkeijin workers themselves have moved into supervisory positions.

Undoubtedly, the Nikkeijin have been able to achieve higher rates of occupational mobility in Japan than their Latin American counterparts in the United States because they were better educated and more occupationally skilled in their countries of origin. Several survey studies have shown that Latin American Nikkeijin are often people who were white-collar office workers and professionals in their home countries, but who were willing to do manual work in Japan because of the very large real-wage differential.

The essential role now played by the Nikkeijin in the economies of some of the smaller industrial cities outside of the Tokyo metropolitan area is readily acknowledged by local officials, who are quite protective of their Nikkeijin workers. Many Japanese employers have considered them a blessing, since the Nikkeijin are virtually the only *legally admitted* foreign workers who can be used to fill *unskilled* jobs, with the exception of foreigners who are accepted for "company trainee" programs.

While some will eventually return to Latin America to live once they have attained their savings target, the bulk of the more than 150,000 Nikkeijin now in Japan seem to be evolving into a more stable work force that no longer plays merely a supplemental role in the country's

labor markets. Even during Japan's current recession, most of the Nikkeijin are not behaving, nor are they being treated, like prototypically "disposable" migrant workers. As noted above, some Japanese employers seem to have developed a clear preference for Nikkeijin workers and are very reluctant to lay them off due to the recession.

As for the immigrants themselves, despite a drop in average total earnings, caused in many cases by a reduced opportunities for overtime work, there are no signs of large-scale return migration to Latin America by Nikkeijin who are no longer employable in Japan. While employment opportunities for them at large firms have contracted, they are finding work in smaller firms that did not previously employ Nikkeijin workers but which still cannot compete successfully for native-born Japanese labor, even in the midst of what is, by Japanese standards, a severe recession. Skilled workers are still needed by small and medium-sized firms, especially those outside the Tokyo region, which often offer salaries 40 percent lower than those paid by large, centrally located firms and working conditions that are usually much less attractive. In short, there is still a significant niche for foreign workers in the Japanese industrial structure, despite the recession.

Some Nikkeijin reportedly have been laid off by manufacturing firms, but even these workers seem to be surviving by moving around within the labor market: changing work places, seeking jobs in other sectors of the economy (e.g., service activities like food distribution). Just like the foreign "guestworkers" who were caught in Western Europe by the oil shocks of the 1970s and the sharp economic downturn that followed, Nikkeijin workers in Japan are likely to "ride out" the

current recession and remain part of the country's labor force.

A similar pattern can be observed in the United States. After three years of recession and an extremely sluggish recovery, the influx of new immigrants from Latin America continues unabated, and there is no evidence of significant return migration. A recent report by the U.S. government Commission on Agricultural Workers concluded that the proportion of illegal immigrants in the work force in many parts of the country is virtually the same as a decade ago, despite the recession, and despite the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which was supposed to deter both prospective illegal migrants and the U.S. employers who might hire them. Certain sectoral and regional labor markets — especially agricultural labor markets, and in large cities, the informal, street-corner labor markets where foreign migrants seek day-labor in construction or services — seem saturated at present. There are fewer such jobs available during the recession, while the number of newly-arriving immigrants has not diminished. But the demand for foreign labor persists, and the immigrants themselves have adjusted to the recession by spending more time seeking work, accepting lower wages, and making do with fewer days of work per week.

As measured by the number of apprehensions of would-be illegal entrants along the U.S.-Mexico border, the upward trend of Latin American migration to the United States is continuing, despite the length and severity of the recession. Apprehensions of would-be illegal entrants by the Border Patrol during the first seven months of Fiscal Year 1993 (October 1992 through April 1993) were 1 percent higher than during the same period in the preceding fiscal year, even though employment conditions in key immigrant-receiving states like Califor-

nia have worsened since then. The same phenomenon could be observed during the U.S. recession of 1981–82, which was even deeper than the current one: Mexican and other Latin American migrants did not leave, and U.S.-born workers were as reluctant as ever to take “immigrant” jobs.

All this is strongly indicative of the *structural*, non-cyclical nature of the relative labor shortage that has developed in both Japan and the United States, especially in the small-business sector. The resilience of the demand for Latin American immigrant labor also demonstrates the extent to which these immigrants have entrenched themselves in certain labor markets, not just as supplements to the native-born work force, but as the primary labor source, *preferred* by employers over theoretically available, native-born workers for a variety of reasons — not just lower labor costs.

The low volume of return migration to Latin America, even under conditions of reduced take-home pay and more limited employment opportunities in the United States and Japan, also attests powerfully to the migrants’ lack of alternatives in their home countries. In Mexico, the number of people living in poverty (according to World Bank and United Nations statistical standards) increased by 51 percent during the period from 1981 through 1991. In Peru, the poverty population increased by 102 percent in the same period; in Brazil, the increase was 36 percent⁹. Moreover, the distribution of personal income became significantly more unequal in Mexico and other major labor-exporting countries in Latin America during the “lost decade” of the 1980s¹⁰. In Mexico, the sharp drop in inflation (from an annualized rate of more than 150 percent at the end of 1987 to about 11–12 percent in 1993) has not significantly narrowed the real-wage gap between Mexico and the

United States. Nor has Mexico's success in fighting inflation been matched by progress in expanding the country's employment base. Even during the post-1988 economic recovery, employment creation has lagged far behind the 900,000-1,000,000 jobs per year that would be needed just to accommodate the new entrants to the labor force. While population fertility rates continue to decline in Mexico and most other countries in the region, the labor force continues to grow at a rate of 4 percent or more per annum. In Brazil and Peru, ruinously high inflation rates and extreme economic uncertainty — conditions that are most likely to concern prospective white-collar and other skilled-worker emigrants — have persisted and even intensified, as economic policies oscillated, presidents fell, and finance ministers were replaced with dizzying frequency. All this suggests that, in the foreseeable future, pressures for emigration will continue to be strong in the principal source countries for Latin American migration to the United States and Japan.

TEMPORARY VS. PERMANENT IMMIGRATION? — A FALSE CHOICE

The sooner Japan abandons the principle of "strict rotation" in its national immigration policy, the better. That is the principal lesson taught by the so-called "failed" guestworker programs operated by the West European governments in the 1960s and early '70s, as well as by the "bracero" program of contract labor importation that operated in the United States from 1942 to 1964, permitting the entry of nearly 5 million supposedly temporary agricultural workers.

All such attempts by governments to manage immigration flows by confining foreign workers to short-term contracts, to specific jobs in

specific firms, located in certain sectors of the economy are doomed to failure, because there is inevitably too much “leakage” of workers out of such programs. Governments lack the resources, and perhaps the political will, to enforce the restrictions built into these programs. Eventually, market forces as well as personal circumstances cause both employers and immigrants to break the rules: to stay in the host country after their temporary work contracts have expired; to move to other jobs, in other sectors of the economy; to bring their dependents from the home country, whether or not this can be done legally.

When a large portion of the so-called “temporary” workers do not go home and end up settling more-or-less permanently in the labor-importing country, the native-born population feels that it has been deceived by its own government, and the stage is set for an anti-immigrant backlash. What we are seeing in Europe today is exactly that: a delayed reaction to immigration policies initiated twenty or thirty years ago, policies that were based on faulty, even naive assumptions about the behavior of migrants and employers; policies that were misrepresented to the general public by the political class.

Nevertheless, this type of immigration policy is politically attractive in the short-term, because it creates the illusion that the nation’s need for foreign-born labor can be met without upsetting the country’s ethnic balance and without incurring any long-term social responsibilities. Indeed, the host society is encouraged to ignore the unmet needs of foreign workers and their children for education, health care, and decent housing. And by making it difficult or impossible for foreign workers who are brought in initially on short-term contracts to acquire citizenship in the host country, the strict rotation principle also postpones the day of reckoning, when demands for voting rights and other

forms of political representation among the second or third-generation offspring of “temporary” workers become so strong that they can no longer be ignored, at least without risking serious disruptions.

That is precisely what we can observe today in Germany, where the vast majority of the 1.8 million Turks — two-thirds of whom have been living in Germany for at least a decade — have no political rights, even if they were born and have lived their entire lives in Germany. The members of this second generation, while identifying culturally with Germany rather than Turkey, feel like total outsiders, vulnerable to racist attacks, police abuses, and other forms of discrimination. Finally, in the wake of violent assaults on long-settled members of their community by neo-Nazi “skinheads,” the second-generation Turks are aggressively demanding political representation and changes in German law that would enable them to be granted dual citizenship, without the obstacles that currently exist. So long as Japan clings to the principle of rotating migrant workers through jobs that are, for all practical purposes, permanent rather than temporary in character, it may be laying the groundwork for similar turmoil down the road.


However, in Japan the strict-rotation principle has already been partially eroded by the highly liberal immigration policy for Latin American Nikkeijin. Their visas can be renewed an unlimited number of times, and they can easily become *de facto* permanent employees and residents of Japan, if they choose to. The revision of the Emigration and Immigration Law in June 1990 also made it possible for the Nikkeijin to bring their dependents from Latin America to live in Japan, including husbands and wives of *non*-Japanese ancestry. (The foreign guestworkers in Europe did not receive this family reunification privilege until after 1973, when new labor recruitment in the countries

of origin was halted.) Some employers prefer Nikkeijin who arrive as couples, perceiving them as more stable workers, likely to remain in Japan for longer periods. More generally, employers of the Nikkeijin seem to be taking more seriously the need to facilitate their permanent settlement and socio-cultural integration. As a result, growing numbers of Nikkeijin are making the transition from mere “hired hands” to valued, long-term employees. As the personnel manager of one Japanese company observed recently:

“We just wanted ‘hands’ until a while ago. We thought we bought only ‘hands’ [by hiring Nikkeijin workers provided by a subcontractor]. Now we understand that won’t do. Settling into a job is difficult unless the worker understands the Japanese language. We must regard them as our employees.”

Because of all these facilitating and motivating factors, the Brazilian Nikkeijin have been shifting rapidly toward permanent settlement (or at least longer stays) in Japan¹²⁾. Since 1987, there has been a growing gap between the number of Brazilians arriving in Japan each year and the number departing (see Figure 1 below)¹³⁾. Some students of the Nikkeijin migration to Japan have expressed skepticism that they will remain permanently, because of the discrimination they encounter from native-born Japanese and their persistently strong cultural identification with Latin America¹⁴⁾. The skeptics point out that only a small minority of the Nikkeijin came to Japan intending to settle permanently there (between 2 and 18 percent, depending on the nationality, according to a 1991 sample survey of 3,000 Nikkeijin)¹⁵⁾. But in the case of Mexican migrants to the U.S., Turkish migrants to Germany, and many other expatriate groups in industrialized coun-

tries, intentions upon arrival have been a notoriously poor predictor of actual behavior, especially as immigrants' children — most of them born abroad — grow up, receive their schooling, and identify themselves culturally with the host society.



The policy of allowing the Latin American Nikkeijin essentially unrestricted access to the labor market for as long as they want it was conceived by Japanese officials as a politically low-cost way of helping to solve the chronic and deepening labor shortage, since Nikkeijin admissions are consistent with the principle of maintaining the country's cultural and racial homogeneity¹⁶). Even this type of immigration will eventually leave a socio-cultural residue in the host country, however. Even while they are being changed by Japanese language acquisition and prolonged exposure to other elements of Japanese culture, the Nikkeijin are forming ethnic communities — social networks and/or geographically-defined enclaves — that rein-

force and perpetuate some aspects of the Latin American cultures from which they came. The Nikkeijin and other long-staying immigrants will inevitably generate some culturally-grounded social tensions in a country like Japan, where such a small proportion of the general public has had sustained, personal contact with foreign workers¹⁷⁾. The more discrimination they experience from the host society, the more they will tend to retreat into ethnic enclaves that, while psychologically supportive, may limit their future socio-cultural integration and economic mobility prospects in Japan¹⁸⁾. By treating them as an established ethnic minority group rather than a stream of transient workers, Japan may be able to prevent the emergence of a “permanent under-class” of Nikkeijin and their offspring.

The continuing expansion and liberalization of “company trainee” programs for foreign workers has the potential to further undermine the strict-rotation principle underlying current Japanese immigration policy. Employer requirements under these programs were recently liberalized by the Ministry of Justice. The revisions increased the total number of foreign trainees that can be accepted by each firm, lengthened by one year the trainee’s maximum stay in Japan (two full years are now allowed), and expanded the percentage of time (now up to two-thirds of total “training hours”) that trainees can spend in on-the-job (“practical”) training *vs.* classroom instruction in Japanese language and job skills¹⁹⁾. Taken together, these changes will have the effect of increasing the employer’s incentive to retain foreign trainees beyond the official training period, and of enhancing the foreign worker’s potential mobility within the Japanese labor market, should he choose to remain in the country.

To summarize: The U.S. and West European experiences demon-

strate that an official policy requiring that all foreigners be admitted on a temporary basis only will not, in the long run, prevent permanent settlement of at least a significant minority of those who enter initially on short-term visas²⁰⁾. If the United States experience is any guide, labor migration to Japan from developing countries — whether it occurs legally or illegally — will become less temporary in character over time, as informal labor recruitment networks based on relatives, employers, labor contractors, and travel agencies become well-established and extend themselves, in both the sending and receiving countries.²¹⁾

(MIS)MANAGING THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

In all of the Western industrialized countries today, the politics of immigration have turned ugly. The late 1980s and early 1990s have brought a resurgence of anti-foreigner hostility, which in most of these countries has taken the form of organized movements and even political parties, like the National Front in France, the Republican Party in Germany, and the Vlams Blok party in Belgium — all of which appeal to the electorate by using explicitly anti-foreign slogans and policy prescriptions.

In Spain, no political party has yet attempted to exploit the growing public concern over immigration from North Africa, but all of the established parties are increasingly concerned about the longer-term potential for an organized, anti-immigrant movement. In all other West European countries today, and in the United States, we can now find some form of organized, anti-immigrant political activity, as well as a hardening of general public opinion against immigration.

That “hardening” of public opinion can be noted in numerous sample surveys, in which large majorities of respondents say that they favor more restrictive immigration policies: admit far fewer legal immigrants and refugees; deport as many as possible of the illegal immigrants already in the country; do whatever is necessary to tighten border controls and strengthen enforcement of sanctions against employers who hire illegal immigrants.

Public opinion polls also show, in each of these countries, that the average resident blames immigrants for many of the social and economic problems that afflict their country, their city, and their neighborhood: petty crime, drug traffic, unemployment, housing shortages, poor and overcrowded schools, traffic congestion, and so forth. In several of these countries — most notably, Germany, Britain, and the United States — rising anti-immigrant hostility has culminated in “spontaneous,” violent attacks on foreign-born workers. These acts of violence have been confined to particular regions and cities, but the general trend is toward dispersion.

How do we explain the recent emergence of nativist (anti-immigrant) movements and attitudes in today’s industrialized countries? It is possible to identify several common denominators of these “backlashes” to recent immigration:

Economic distress and uncertainty. In every case, deteriorating economic conditions — lower growth rates, higher unemployment, dislocations caused by economic restructuring, and in the German case, the costs of national reunification — have been a key conditioning factor. Economic change and recession create a sense of general insecurity and uncertainty about the future. Under such conditions, foreign workers are more likely to be seen as competitors for jobs and

social services, rather than as complements to the native-born work force. This perception feeds a “zero-sum” mentality: immigrants’ gains must mean a commensurate loss, of some sort, for the native-born population.

Rising crime rates. In virtually every industrialized country today, polls show that the citizenry is increasingly concerned about personal security; about rampant “lawlessness” and the breakdown of public order. Immigrants — especially poor, dark-skinned ones — are assumed to be a key source of crime. Economic hard times only exacerbate this assumed linkage between immigration and crime. Of course, crime rates do rise during economic recessions; but there is usually little or no evidence that impoverished immigrants contribute disproportionately to those increases in crime.

A generalized sense of “loss of control” over one’s destiny. That loss is symbolized by ineffective international border controls: in the case of the United States, massive numbers of illegal entries along the border with Mexico; in the case of Western Europe, highly porous land borders and coastlines in Italy and Spain, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of would-be “refugees” still streaming into the region from Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, one of the great fears today is that the last stages of the process of continental economic integration will cause a massive increase in immigration — not only from the East, but from the Third World, as internal border controls within the European Community are dismantled. Similarly, the threat of a massive influx of Mexican migrants into the U.S., displaced from their jobs in Mexico by a flood of cheap U.S. imports, is being used as one of the arguments against the proposed North American free trade agreement.

Changes in the composition of immigration flows. In most of the Western industrialized countries, there has been a shift toward an immigration flow that is increasingly dominated by culturally, religiously, linguistically, and racially distinct persons originating in just a few Third World countries. Hostility toward immigrants is still rather selective in most industrialized countries today. The fact that the most recent immigrants to countries like France and Spain are mostly colored and non-Christian has a great deal to do with the hostile reception that many of them are getting from the native-born population. France, the same country that had little difficulty accepting waves of Poles, Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese in earlier decades of this century, is now repelled by the arrival of dark-skinned, North African Muslims. In Spain, Polish immigrants are still welcomed, as are most Latin American nationals; but Moroccans and Algerians are despised as vagrants and feared as criminals. In Germany, it is the Turks who are considered undesirable and unassimilable. In the United States, there is a well-defined hierarchy of preference, in terms of which kinds of immigrants are perceived to be more beneficial to the country: Mexicans are at the bottom of the heap; northern Europeans are at the top; East Asians are somewhere in between.²²⁾

But however selective the new nativism may be in these countries, there is a generalized sense that the kinds of immigrants that they are receiving today are less assimilable, and more likely to actively assert their cultural and religious identity, than previous waves of immigrants from other source countries. The rate of social and cultural integration among these new immigrants is commonly believed to be much lower than among their predecessors, even though the empirical evidence does not support this notion²³⁾. It is highly unlikely that this idea

would have gained such widespread credence, if the immigrant flow to the United States by the early 1980s had not become so dominated by people from a single cultural and linguistic group — namely, immigrants from *Spanish*-speaking, Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Extreme spatial concentration of new immigrants. The clustering of the latest waves of immigrants in particular regions, cities, neighborhoods, and low-income housing projects has made them much more visible to the native-born population than if they had been more spatially dispersed. Clustered in major metropolitan areas, the new immigrants are much easier to blame for general overcrowding problems. Moreover, whether it is in the suburbs of Paris or Brussels or San Diego, native-born residents of adjacent or nearby neighborhoods feel insecure about their personal safety and their property values when they are confronted with a large concentration of foreigners who are ethnically, racially, and culturally different from them. There have always been “immigrant ghettos” in the cities of the United States and most other industrialized countries. But seldom have such large numbers of newly-arrived immigrants been living in such close proximity to native-born residents belonging to the middle and upper social classes.

Triggering events. Serious outbursts of anti-immigrant hostility in industrialized countries are often touched off by a catalytic or precipitating event. Deeply-embedded cultural hatreds and fear of foreigners are always latent in these societies (e.g., in Spain, the hatred and distrust of “*los moros*” — i.e., North African Muslims). These deeply ingrained cultural attitudes are more likely to bubble to the surface during periods of economic hardship and uncertainty. But

even in times of generalized economic distress, it often takes a “trigger” — a precipitating event — to activate latent xenophobia; to cause serious scapegoating of immigrants, and perhaps even to provoke violence against them. In recent years, such triggering events have taken the form of isolated but highly publicized assertions of cultural distinctiveness by immigrants (e.g., the insistence of a few Islamic school girls on wearing headscarfs to public school in a Paris suburb), and acts of criminality committed by foreigners (e.g., the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, which focused public attention on the immigrants who participated).

IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN

Can Japan avoid the kinds of immigration policy outcomes observable today in Western industrialized countries? Already there are some worrisome signs. For example, an increase in crimes allegedly attributable to foreigners is being used by the Japanese Labor Ministry as a pretext for closer monitoring of the hiring practices of employers who use foreign workers²⁵. Media commentators have begun using the same argument, warning that a larger presence of foreigners could make it impossible to maintain the “low crime rates and little social disorder [that] have been the pillars of our society²⁶.” There are numerous, more objective experts on Japanese society, both in the Japanese academic community and abroad, who are deeply skeptical of Japan’s ability to prevent a nativist backlash.

Much, of course, will depend on the rate at which Japan’s stock of foreign workers and their dependents grows. A *gradual* increase will be important to assure the public that the government is maintaining

control over the immigration process. By the same logic, the development of a sense of "loss of control" among the Japanese public could be fatal to a rationalization and liberalization of immigration policy, despite recent various national surveys of public opinion in Japan completed since 1989 that suggest a generally higher level of tolerance for expanded immigration — even of unskilled foreign workers — than can be found in other industrialized countries today. If the Japanese people become convinced that the floodgates have been opened to uncontrolled Third World immigration, even an awareness that their economic self-interest — in terms of higher economic growth, rising living standards, etc. — would be served by a more expansionary immigration policy probably would not be adequate to override strong, culturally-based resistance to opening the society to foreigners.

Several important factors are working in Japan's favor, however. First, the rate at which the foreign-born population is growing is still far more under government control in Japan than it is in all other major industrialized countries, with the exception of Britain. Barring a major shift in the current movements of Chinese boat people away from the United States and toward the coasts of Japan [New York City is still the preferred destination, not Tokyo], Japan should not be faced, in the foreseeable future, with the kinds of large-scale clandestine entry problems that plague other industrialized nations today.

The Japanese government also has at its command an arsenal of immigration control measures that would be the envy of governments in other industrialized countries. For example, Japan has demonstrated, in the cases of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iran, that it can effectively use a highly restrictive visa issuance policy to shut off unauthorized immigration flows from particular sending countries. Through

the local police forces, Japanese authorities also have the capability to locate and deport illegal immigrants who are visa-overstayers, if they choose to. Police stations in every Japanese neighborhood keep close tabs on residents within their jurisdictions. They have the knowledge and capacity to round up virtually every foreigner living illegally in their neighborhood and deliver them to national immigration authorities for expulsion, without risking a public outcry. This type of potential immigration control capability is unique among industrialized countries today. Elsewhere, not only do local police and national-level immigration authorities lack the manpower to keep track of the movements of visa-overstayers and would-be “political refugees” who have been denied such status; they would also encounter stiff resistance from leaders of ethnic communities, human rights advocates, churches, and other politically active groups if they attempted systematic round-up and deportation campaigns against the settled, illegal immigrant population.

Finally, thus far there are no nationally significant, anti-immigrant movements or political parties in Japan to which public officials must respond, and which might limit their policy options for the future. A few ultra-rightist fringe groups have begun to agitate for the expulsion of foreign workers, distributing “neo-Nazi” leaflets and wall-posters; but they have had difficulty mobilizing broader support. In contrast to the Western industrialized countries in recent years, there have been no violent assaults on foreigners in Japan.

Moreover, it should be possible for the Japanese government to make a highly plausible case for a more liberalized policy of permanent legal immigration, simply by openly recognizing the country’s demographic and economic realities and leading general public opinion toward a

deeper understanding of those realities. Much of the political sting could be taken out of the immigration issue by such preemptive measures, and by embracing a forward-looking national immigration policy — one that anticipates national needs and public responses. This would be a refreshing and constructive alternative to the kind of reactive, spasmodic, crisis-driven immigration policy-making that we see today in Western Europe — where immigration policy almost literally is being made “in the streets” — as well as in the United States.

The demographic and economic realities that justify a more thoughtful, forward-looking approach to immigration policy-making are more evident in Japan than in any other industrialized country today. Japan's total fertility rate of 1.53 children per woman (in 1991) is already among the world's lowest,²⁹⁾ and according to official 1992 population projections, Japan's population will begin to decline, in absolute terms, within just 18 years — assuming no further drop in the country's fertility rate³⁰⁾. Moreover, Japan's population is aging more rapidly than in any other industrial nation. Recent estimates show Japan becoming the first country in the world to have one-fifth or more of its population above the age of 65, a proportion that will be reached only thirteen years from now. By contrast, the United States will require 32 years for one-fifth of its population to be 65 and older; Switzerland will take 54 years; Germany, 62 years; and Sweden, 66 years. By the year 2025, 27.3 percent of the Japanese population will be 65 years or older.³¹⁾

Finally, the relative shortage of labor in Japan, particularly in small and medium-sized firms, has been chronic, at least since the mid-1980s; there is no reason to believe that it will disappear, once the Japanese economy has recovered from the current recession. The recession,

coupled with the arrival of the Nikkeijin from Latin America, may have relieved the labor shortage somewhat, but that is only a temporary reprieve. Japan's economy will rebound; the reserves of Nikkeijin labor in Latin America will be exhausted, within a relatively short period; and the labor shortage, which until now has primarily affected manufacturing industry, will soon be felt in the service sector. As in the United States during the 1980s, Japan in the remainder of this decade and beyond can expect a robust growth of demand for unskilled workers in hotels, restaurants, health care facilities, janitorial services, and many other types of services. Even without a renewed economic boom, Japan's need for new workers will continue to grow, because of the government's policy of encouraging firms to reduce working hours for their regular employees, to improve their quality of life and, hopefully, increase their consumption of imported goods, thereby easing trade frictions with then United States.

There is no convincing evidence that Japan's future demand for labor — especially to fill low-status, “3-K” jobs in services and construction — can be met by domestic labor supplies, at least in the absence of some truly fundamental changes in gender roles, job aspirations, and life styles, especially among young Japanese. Nor is it likely that the most frequently advocated *alternatives* to importing foreign labor — i.e., making greater use of native-born female and elderly labor, further reducing labor requirements through robotics, and moving more manufacturing production abroad — will prove adequate to dealing with a labor shortage as massive and non-cyclical in nature as that facing Japan. The Keidanren, which has predicted a labor shortfall of about 5 million by the year 2000 (assuming average annual GNP and productivity increases of 3.5 percent during the remainder of

the current decade), has stressed the long-term, intractable nature of this problem:

“From now on, . . . at least during the remainder of this century, a fundamentally different problem will confront the country: an absolute shortage of labor resulting from structural, not cyclical, factors. The drop in the birthrate in recent years is bound to become a major economic problem — in the form of a shrinking young labor force — toward the end of the 1990s. And the problem will almost certainly create a more serious labor shortage in the 21st century, thus putting a drag on economic growth. The falling birthrate is indeed a serious problem that may very well alter the nation’s economic structure.”³²⁾

A vast expansion of the existing, government-sanctioned “company trainee” programs, which thus far have supplied fewer than 45,000 foreign workers to Japan each year, is one theoretically available approach to meeting the labor shortage. This policy option is apparently preferred by many public officials and business leaders. However, existing company trainee programs operate on the “strict rotation” principle; thus they serve to perpetuate the illusion that Japan can indefinitely keep its foreign-born work force “temporary,” thereby preserving ethnic and racial homogeneity and avoiding the burden of providing social services to a settled immigrant population that includes women and children — not just unaccompanied males.

If company trainee programs are expanded enough to meet a much larger portion of Japan’s labor needs than they do today, U.S. and European experience suggests that “leakage” of workers out of these augmented programs will contribute significantly to the growth of the

permanent stock of immigrants in Japan. There is no existing enforcement mechanism adequate to guarantee that “company trainees” will actually return to their home countries, once their formal training and on-the-job “practical training” periods have ended. At present, the responsibility for repatriating these workers falls mainly upon the sending-country governments, some of which are less vigilant than others.

More coercive approaches to assuring repatriation (e.g., withholding a substantial portion of a worker’s pay until he or she leaves the country, or paying their wages into bank accounts in the home country) are not workable in the Japanese case, partly because under Japanese labor law, foreign “company trainees” are not considered regular employees and do not receive regular wages (only a minimal “living stipend” and housing provided by the employer). Legal experts also point out that the involuntary withholding of compensation and similar tactics would violate basic tenets of existing Japanese labor law.

The principal alternative to a greatly expanded company-trainee system for foreign labor importation would be a formal quota system that would assign annual, numerical quotas of immigrants to each sending country, and perhaps to specific sectors of the Japanese economy³⁴). But the quota systems that have operated for many years in countries like the United States and Canada serve to regulate *permanent* legal immigration; they are not mechanisms for importing short-term foreign labor.

The main point is that Japan needs to look beyond the patchwork of “backdoor” mechanisms that it has developed in recent years to provide unskilled foreign workers for a labor-hungry economy: unrestricted

admissions of Latin American Nikkeijin; company trainee programs; importation of part-time "foreign student" workers who routinely violate official limits on total working hours and who frequently are not *bona fide* students³⁵). These mechanisms together provide, at best, a very inadequate, piecemeal solution to the labor shortage problem. Moreover, as recent West European experience has vividly demonstrated, the unintended consequences of "backdoor" immigration policies can blow up in the face of a government that maintains them for too long. For example, it is difficult to imagine the kind of political turmoil over immigration being experienced today in Germany, France, and other West European countries, in the absence of yet another type of "backdoor" permanent immigration policy: highly liberal "refugee" admissions, with no effort to round up and deport the 95 percent or more of applicants who eventually failed to qualify for political refugee status in most of these countries.

Must Japan continue to insist that no foreign workers should be admitted on a *permanent* basis? Is the relatively high level of tolerance for immigration shown in Japanese public opinion polls really dependent on the expectation that foreign workers will remain strictly temporary? Must the Japanese government maintain the fiction that no *unskilled* foreign workers are needed in the Japanese economy? What price should be paid, in terms of future economic growth, in order to maintain the notion of Japan as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous country, whose social harmony would be destroyed by a more open immigration policy? To what extent is ethnic and cultural homogeneity really the basis of Japan's economic success, as well as its social harmony?

Perhaps these are among the elements of conventional Japanese

thinking that should be reexamined in the years ahead. One of the titans of Japanese industry, Sony Chairman Akio Morita, recently called for such a reexamination:

“We must realize that certain parts of the political and economic system that provided the foundation for building Japan’s massive economic power are today applying the brakes on progress. . . . It is these systems collectively that have earned the appellation of ‘Fortress Japan.’ If Japan persists in clinging to its traditional systems, it runs the risk of becoming isolated in the world and inviting its own economic decline.”³⁶⁾

Morita has suggested specifically that “over time, we should seek to create an environment in which the movement of goods, services, capital, technology, *and people* throughout North America, Europe, and Japan is truly free and unfettered.”³⁷⁾

The United States has long celebrated itself as a “nation of immigrants” — a “country of refuge” that has always been more open to immigration than other industrialized countries, and more tolerant of ethnic and cultural diversity. That has been the official mythology. The reality is that the United States has never really come to terms with the fact that it is a “country of immigration.” We have never wanted to admit that the functioning of our economy and our economic growth are dependent to some degree on new waves of immigrants. We have always resented the “cultural baggage” that immigrants bring with them. Over a 45-year period during which nationwide public opinion polling on the subject was done many times, only once, in 1953, did more than 10 percent of the U.S. public favor *increasing* the number of immigrants permitted to enter the country (see Table 1

below). Indeed, throughout this period, at least three times as many Americans supported *decreasing* the number of immigrant admissions.³⁸⁾

TABLE 1: U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON THE NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS THAT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENTER, 1946-1990
(in percentages)

Choices	1946 ^a	1953	1955	1977	1981	1982	1986	1988	1990 ^b
More/increase	5	13	8	7	5	4	7	6	9
Same/present level	32	37	39	37	22	23	35	34	29
Fewer/decrease	37	39	33	42	65	66	49	53	48
	[14] ^c								
No opinion/ don't know	12	11	20	14	8	7	9	7	14

^aIn 1946, the question was phrased: "Should we permit more persons from Europe to come to this country each year than we did before the war, should we keep the number about the same, or should we reduce the number?" In the subsequent polls the question was usually phrased as follows: "Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?"

^bIn 1990, the question was phrased: "Is it your impression that the current immigration laws allow too many immigrants, too few immigrants, or about the right number of immigrants into this country each year?"

^c"None" was offered as a choice of response only in 1946, and 14 percent selected that choice.

Source: Roper Center, (Storrs: University of Connecticut Press, 1991).

U.S. administrations traditionally have favored "symbolic" immigration control policies that responded to short-term political pressures but were never capable of altering the fundamental social, economic, and demographic forces that drive immigration to the United States and affect the utilization of immigrant labor in our society³⁹⁾. Indeed, these policies, including the landmark Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, were destined to fail precisely because they failed to address the underlying realities of the immigration process⁴⁰⁾. Similarly, according to economist Haruo Shimada,

“The Japanese people don’t want to face up to the requirements of a formal national immigration policy — the need for a real social integration policy, efforts to combat exploitative labor practices and discrimination against foreigners, solutions for housing problems, the education of immigrant children, and so forth. They want to avoid open confrontations and debates on basic principles, like ‘one nation, one people.’ But the Japanese are a very realistic, pragmatic people. So they support the development of company-based networks [the “company trainee” programs] to accommodate foreigners as their employees. This amounts to a *de facto* immigration policy, but without laws, rules, principles, or public debates. Moving toward a formal immigration policy with explicit acceptance criteria and proper control mechanisms will be a painful process for Japan. But we must bring foreigners in as human beings — or we shouldn’t bring them in at all!”⁴¹⁾

As an immigration scholar, as an occasional advisor to the U.S. government on immigration policy (usually to no avail), and as an admirer of many aspects of the Japanese society and economy, I would like to associate myself with this line of thinking. I would also like to encourage you, the members of the Japanese academic community who are undoubtedly among the most sensitive to the opportunities and challenges posed by contemporary international migration, to pursue the kinds of fieldwork-based research, among both immigrants and employers, that will be much needed in the future as input for a more pragmatic, innovative, humane, and ultimately more successful approach to immigration policy-making in Japan.

NOTES

- 1) Keynote address to the Japan Association of Latin American Studies, Sophia University, Tokyo, June 12-13, 1993.
- 2) This problem varies considerably by nationality. For example, according to some estimates, 50 percent of the Peruvian "Nikkeijin" now in Japan have false documentation. The proportion of "false Nikkeijin" among immigrants from Brazil is believed to be much lower.
- 3) Reported in Iyo Kunimoto, "Japanese Migration to Latin America," in Barbara Stallings and Gabriel Székely, eds., *Japan, the United States, and Latin America: Toward a Trilateral Relationship in the Western Hemisphere* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 114.
- 4) See Lisa Bornstein, "From *Carioca* to *Karaoke*: Brazilian Guestworkers in Japan," *Berkeley Planning Journal* (University of California at Berkeley), Vol. 7 (1992), p. 49. Bornstein notes that because of different entrance and work permit requirements, official data on Nikkeijin may "grossly underestimate the number of Brazilians working in Japan." Applications for work visas by Brazilian Nikkeijin that are processed by the Japanese embassy and regional consulates within Brazil mark the *lower* limit of Brazilian guestworkers in Japan. Estimates that include Nikkeijin who travel to Japan as tourists and subsequently obtain work permits there run as high as 250,000.
- 5) Takeshi Inagami, Yasuo Kuwahara, and General Research Institute of People's Financial Savings, *Gaikokujin Rodo-sha-o Senryoku-ka suru Chusho Kigyo* (Tokyo: Chusho Kigyo Risachi Senta, 1992), p. 45.
- 6) For reviews of the relevant evidence, see Wayne A. Cornelius, "The U.S. Demand for Mexican Labor," in Wayne Cornelius and Jorge A. Bustamante, eds., *Mexican Migration to the United States: Origins, Consequences, and Policy Options* (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, for the Bilateral

- Commission on the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations, 1989), pp. 25-47; and Wayne A. Cornelius, ed., *The Changing Role of Mexican Labor in the U.S. Economy: Sectoral Perspectives* (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, forthcoming).
- 7) Takesi Fukada and Takanori Sezaki, "Retto-waido: Fukyo-ni Yureru Nikkeijin Rodo-sha," *Nihon Keizai Shimun*, December 7, 1992.
 - 8) Apprehension data for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 provided to the author by the Statistics Division, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, through the courtesy of Dr. Robert Warren.
 - 9) Source: Richard Weisskoff, "Basic Human Needs and the Democratic Process in Latin America," *North-South Issues* (University of Miami), Vol. 2, No. 2 (1993), Table 2.
 - 10) The regressive changes in Mexico's income distribution during the 1980s have been documented by Fernando Cortés and Rosa María Rubalcava, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, El Colegio de México, México, D.F.
 - 11) Quoted in Fukada and Sezaki, "Retto-waido: Fukyo-ni Yureru Nikkeijin Rodosha," *op. cit.*
 - 12) It is also true that some of the Nikkeijin have decided to extend their stays in Japan, or to make repeat visits, because they were unable to attain their savings targets during the originally planned period of employment in Japan. Some seriously underestimated their living expenses in Japan, due to poor information received in their country of origin.
 - 13) Entry and exit data are from Bornstein, "Brazilian Guestworkers in Japan," *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.
 - 14) See, for example, Kunimoto, "Japanese Migration to Latin America," *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19.

- 15) Kaigai Nikkeijin Kyokai, *Nikkeijin Honpo Shuro Jittai Chosa Hokokusho* (Tokyo: Kaigai Kyoryoku Jigyodan, 1992).
- 16) For a summary of the official documentation on this point, see Keiko Yamanaka, "Unskilled Foreign Workers and the New Immigration Policies of Japan," revised version of a paper presented at the 44th Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., April 1992, p. 7.
- 17) For examples of culturally-grounded hostility toward Brazilian Nikkeijin, see Bornstein, "Brazilian Guestworkers in Japan," *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62.
- 18) For a more detailed elaboration of this point, see Takeyuki Tsuda, "Strangers in Their Homeland: The Ethnic Adaptation of Japanese-Brazilian Return Migrants and the Japanese Sociopolitical Response," paper presented at the 14th National Convention of the Japan Association of Latin American Studies, Tokyo, June 12-13, 1993.
- 19) For details of these changes, see: "Gaikokujin Kenshuu-sei no Ukeire Taisho Kakudai," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, December 10, 1992.
- 20) For a careful empirical analysis of the long-term consequences of the U.S. "bracero" program of contract labor importation for permanent settlement of Mexican migrants in the United States, see: Douglas S. Massey and Zai Liang, "The Long-term Consequences of a Temporary Worker Program: The U.S. Bracero Experience," *Population Research and Policy Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 1989), pp. 199-226.
- 21) For detailed case studies of transnational migratory network formation in the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Dominican Republic contexts, see: Douglas S. Massey, et al., *Return to Aztlán: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987); and Sherri Grasmuck and Patricia R. Pessar, *Between Two Islands: Dominican International Migration* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991). A review of the evidence documenting the shift from temporariness to a higher incidence

- of permanent settlement in Mexican migration to the United States can be found in: Wayne A. Cornelius, "From Sojourners to Settlers: The Changing Profile of Mexican Immigration to the United States," in Jorge A. Bustamante, Clark W. Reynolds, and Raúl A. Hinojosa Ojeda, eds., *U.S.-Mexico Relations: Labor Market Interdependence* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 155-195. Bornstein documents the proliferation of network-based labor recruitment and emigration to Japan of Brazilian Nikkeijin in her article, "Brazilian Guestworkers in Japan," *op. cit.*, pp. 57-60.
- 22) See the national sample survey data reported in: Rita J. Simon and Susan H. Alexander, *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion, and Immigration* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), pp. 45-46. On the "hierarchy of preference" in the southern California region, see: Wayne A. Cornelius, "America in the Era of Limits: The New Nativism and the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations," in Carlos Vásquez and Manuel García y Griego, eds., *Mexico-U.S. Relations* (Los Angeles, Calif.: Chicano Studies Research Center, UCLA, 1983).
- 23) For example, a national survey of the Latino population of the United States conducted in 1989-1990 found overwhelming agreement that everyone in the U.S. should learn English; that first-generation Latino immigrants are learning English at about the same pace as previous waves of immigrants; and that among U.S.-born Latinos (i.e., the second generation and beyond), two-thirds use English predominantly. Only about one-fourth of U.S.-born people of Latino ancestry are bilingual (use both English and Spanish). See Rodolfo de la Garza, et al., *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1992).
- 24) According to one study of arrest records, 39 percent of those convicted of felonies, mostly looting offenses, were foreign-born, primarily from Mexico and Central America. (Paul Lieberman and Richard O'Reilly, "Most Looters Endured Lives of Crime, Poverty," *Los Angeles Times*, May 2, 1993.)
- 25) "Gaikokujin Koyo: Kanshi Kyoka-e Shishin," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*,

January 7, 1993.

- 26) Hajime Yamamoto, quoted in Kaori Shoji, "The Changing Face of Japanese Labor," *Business Tokyo*, January 1991, p. 22.
- 27) For a summary of these public opinion poll data, see: Wayne A. Cornelius, "Controlling Immigration: The Case of Japan," in Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James Hollifield, eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, forthcoming, 1994).
- 28) Britain officially declares itself to be a country of "zero" immigration; nevertheless, the stock of first-generation immigrants in Britain — mainly from former British colonies in the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent — continues to grow at a rate of estimated at 50,000-60,000 per year. See: Zig Layton-Henry, "Controlling Immigration: The Case of Britain," in Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James Hollifield, eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, forthcoming, 1994).
- 29) Japan, Spain, and Italy are vying for the distinction of having achieved the world's lowest TFR (total fertility rate); the differences among them at this point are very slight.
- 30) Machiko Yanagashita, "Slow Growth Will Turn to Decline of the Japanese Population," *Population Today* (Population Reference Bureau), Vol. 21, No. 5 (May 1993), p. 4. The Japanese government's "middle" projection shows the population shrinking from a peak of 130 million in 2011 to 96 million by the year 2090.
- 31) Projections by the Population Research Institute, Nihon University, based on 1990 census data.
- 32) "Toward Sustainable Growth and Adequate Labor Supply," *Keidanren Review*, No. 135 (June 1992), p. 4.

- 33) I am grateful to Dr. Thomas Berger, Harvard University, for calling my attention to these potential legal obstacles.
- 34) Such a quota system, assigning annually adjusted contingents of foreign labor to specific economic sectors and even to specific regions of the country, was proposed by the Spanish government in 1992. Spain is struggling to devise a national immigration policy after many years of being a labor-*exporting* country to the rest of Europe. Under the recently proposed system, half of the visas allocated each year would be for permanent immigrants and half for temporary foreign workers. Implementation of Spain's proposed quota system has been delayed by the political fall-out from the country's deep, post-1992 recession. For further analysis of the Spanish case, see: Wayne A. Cornelius, "Controlling Immigration: The Case of Spain," in Cornelius, Hollifield, and Martin, eds., *Controlling Illegal Immigration: A Global Perspective*, *op. cit.*
- 35) A Justice Ministry investigation of 57 vocational schools in the Tokyo and Osaka areas between May 1992 and February 1993 found that nearly half of the schools had engaged in illegal practices concerning foreign students, such as submitting fabricated documents to the Immigration Control Bureau. Japan has more than 3,400 vocational schools, of which more than 10 percent enroll foreign students (mostly Chinese). In 1992, a total of 37,736 foreigners were legally admitted to Japan on college student and pre-college (including vocational and language school) student visas. (*The Japan Times*, June 13, 1993.)
- 36) Akio Morita, "How to Renew the Global Economic Framework," *International Economic Insights* (Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.), March/April 1993, p. 26; translated from the February 1993 issue of the Japanese monthly, *Bungei Shunju*.
- 37) Akio Morita, "Toward a New World Economic Order," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 271, No. 6 (June 1993), p. 92 (emphasis added).
- 38) For further analysis of these and other relevant survey data, see Simon

and Alexander, *The Ambivalent Welcome*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-49.

- 39) For a detailed review of "symbolic" immigration policies in the United States, see: Kitty Calavita, "The Immigration Policy Debate: Critical Analysis and Future Options," in Cornelius and Bustamante, eds., *Mexican Migration to the United States*, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-177; and Kitty Calavita, *Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S.* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992).
- 40) For a case study, see: Wayne A. Cornelius, "The Impacts of the 1986 U.S. Immigration Law on Emigration from Rural Mexican Sending Communities," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 689-705.
- 41) Personal interview with Haruo Shimada, Keio University, November 14, 1992. More detailed expositions of Professor Shimada's views can be found in his article, "The Employment of Foreign Labor in Japan," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 513 (January 1991), pp. 117-29; and his forthcoming book, *Japan's Guestworkers* (New York: Columbia University Press, in press).