

〈論文〉

Explaining Split-Ticket Voting in the 2000 Federal Elections in Mexico*

Yuriko TAKAHASHI**

Introduction

The Mexico's federal elections held on July 2, 2000 has been considered as "pivotal" in that there were two remarkable events that had a significant impact on the development of democracy in the country (Domínguez and Lawson 2004). First, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI), which had led the hegemonic party system since 1929, lost control of the presidency. The presidential election was in fact competed between three candidates. They were Vicente Fox Quesada of the Alliance for Change (*Alianza por Cambio*, AC), a center-right coalition of the National Action Party (*Partido Acción Nacional*, PAN) and the Green Party (*Partido Verde Ecológico de México*, PVEM); Francisco Labastida of the PRI; and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the Alliance for Mexico (*Alianza por México*, AM), a center-left coalition of the Party of Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD) and other small leftist parties. The vote shares were 42.5% for Fox, 36.1% for Labastida, and 16.6% for Cárdenas. Second, for the first time in the history of Mexico's presidential elections, the Mexicans cast their votes across party lines, leading to the formation of a divided government. For the election of the lower

house, the vote share was 38.3% for the AC, 36.9% for the PRI, and 18.7% for the AM. Since the AC did not have a majority in Congress, the newly elected President had to negotiate with the opposition parties on legislation (Klesner 2002 : 140). Thus, as a consequence of split-ticket voting, the 2000 elections marked not only the end of the PRI dominance but also the emergence of a consensual type of policy making in the Mexican government.

What explains this unprecedented voting behavior in the 2000 federal elections in Mexico? The previous works on this pivotal election have focused exclusively on the following question : why did the pre-electoral opinion polls that favored Labastida and the sound economic performance of the Zedillo administration (1994-2000) not lead to the continued victory for the PRI in the presidential election? (Lawson 2004 : 1-2). They claim that the tangible impact of a campaign message rather than the incumbent performance was decisive to vote choice in 2000. More specifically, by employing a skillful campaign strategy, Fox successfully gained the support of voters who were disaffected from the long-term dominance of the PRI and were hoping for a “change” ; thus, such strategies became more influential as the election day approached (Grupo Financiero Banamex – Accival 2000 ; Domínguez and Lawson 2004 ; Hellman 2000 ; Klesner 2002 ; Hernández 2000 ; Schedler 2000 ; Wallis 2001 ; Watanabe 2002). However, the most important question remains unanswered : why did such massive support for “change” not manifest itself by the increase in the PAN’s vote share in the legislative election to the same extent as in the presidential election?¹⁾ To address this question, this paper attempts to explore why the progressive voters split their tickets by voting for Fox in the presidential election and for another party’s candidate in the legislative election.

Split-ticket voting refers to the behavior of voters who differentiate their votes for candidates from different parties for different elective posts. While

split-ticket voting occurred for the first time in Mexico in the 2000 elections and has become more common since then, this voting pattern has prevailed in democratic political systems, where free and fair elections are guaranteed (McAllister and White 2000 : 564). The arguments on split-ticket voting, which abound particularly in American politics, have primarily revolved around whether split-ticket voting is a consequence of policy coordination among voters who intend to divide the government for policy moderation²⁾. As argued below, in the Mexican context, it is less plausible that such policy coordination was the cause of split-ticket voting in the 2000 elections. Instead, it is more likely that this new voting pattern was a consequence of electoral coordination³⁾. In other words, a segment of Mexican voters chose candidates of different parties for the presidency and legislature, *not* with the intention of dividing the government *but* to avoid “wasted votes” in the presidential election (Cox 1997 : 70).

Why did such electoral coordination occur in the 2000 elections in Mexico? In order to coordinate electoral choices, a voter should be aware of other voters' preferences in order to form an expectation on the electoral outcome. Prior to the 2000 elections, a series of institutional and electoral reforms had been implemented and had reshaped the patterns of political participation by lowering the degree of uncertainty that voters would attach to the electoral outcome (Lawson 2004 : 15). Specifically, these reforms provided greater leeway to opposition parties and civil society actors such as the mass media. These empowered actors provided voters with additional information through news reporting, negative political advertising, and television debates, based on which voters could decide their vote choice (Domínguez 2004 : 337-340). These enhanced opportunities reduced uncertainty and thus induced voters to cast meaningful votes (Lawson and Klesner 2004 : 84 ; Magaloni and Poiré 2004 : 282). The incentive might be greater among

the electorates who aimed to oust the PRI from presidency and were able to process relevant information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998 : 6)⁴). It is plausible that these well-informed voters coordinated their electoral choice and produced incongruent outcomes in the presidential and legislative elections.

On the other hand, the policy outcome was still highly unpredictable because there was no clear separation of powers or difference in the policy platform between the candidates, as is commonly observed in new democracies such as Mexico. This lack of information prevented voters from forecasting future policy outcomes, which depended on different combinations of party control between different branches of government. This unpredictability discouraged voters to strategically split their tickets so as to divide the government for policy moderation. Thus, it is less likely that policy coordination among voters was the factor underlying ticket splitting in 2000.

In the following, I will explain how electoral coordination in the presidential elections resulted in split-ticket voting in the 2000 federal election in Mexico. Survey data on split-ticket voters are required for empirical support ; however, this data was unavailable. As an alternative, this study uses data aggregated at the district level to examine the effects of socioeconomic attributes on the probability of split-ticket voting. In this manner, the voter's motivation behind split-ticket voting is approximately estimated.

The remainder of this paper is as follows. The first section briefly describes Mexico's electoral system and the electoral reforms implemented since 1994, which provided institutional foundations for electoral coordination. The second section discusses the logic of split-ticket voting and draws testable hypotheses. In the third section, a research design and model specification is presented. The fourth section contains the results and their interpretations. Section five concludes with the remaining questions and the future research agenda.

I Electoral System, Electoral Reforms, and the 2000 Federal Elections in Mexico

1 Gradual Reform of Electoral Systems in Democratizing Mexico

The Mexican political system had been characterized as a hegemonic party system since the National Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Nacional*)—the precursor of the PRI—was founded in 1929. Until the 1997 midterm elections, the PRI had dominated all elective offices at the national level, namely, the presidency, the Senate, and the lower house, which characterized Mexico as “an usually unified national government” (Klesner 2002 : 140). However, in the 1997 elections, the PRI lost the majority status in the lower house, leading to a divided government (Klesner 1997 : 567). The emergence of a divided rule proved that Mexico was democratizing because the PRI-led hegemonic system had given way to a competitive political system in which the opposition was accredited as a legitimate actor. Prior to this monumental event, the gradual opening of the political system accelerated since 1994 when the former presidential election was conducted under great political unrest⁵⁾.

In the Mexican electoral system, the elections of the president, deputies, and senators follow different rules. The president is elected directly by the relative majority rule every six years, and reelection is prohibited. There are 128 senators who are elected to 6-year terms. The Senate comprises two seats allocated through the relative majority formula for each of the 32 federal entities, one for each state by the first minority formula, and one out of a nationwide list by proportional representation (PR). Deputies serve a 3-year term. In the lower chamber, 300 seats are allocated by the relative majority to represent a single-member district, and 200 are selected by a modified PR

formula from five electoral regions. In order to win PR seats, the parties must have candidates registered in 200 of the 300 single-member districts. Closed lists are adopted, and parties can register up to 60 candidates in both the PR and plurality race. In order to gain PR seats, parties should receive more than 2% of the national vote. The elections for these offices are conducted concurrently, but midterm elections are scheduled for the lower house and half the Senate.⁶⁾

A series of electoral reforms have been undertaken since 1994, and this gradually opened the political space for opposition parties. In particular, the reform of electoral law enacted in 1996 was crucial in that major opposition parties—the PAN and the PRD—participated in the legislative process to attain approval (Watanabe 2002 : 6). This reform primarily aimed at improving the conditions of fair electoral competition, which is the defining feature of democracy. First, equal access to the mass media, such as radio and television, during electoral campaigns has been guaranteed to all political parties. Second, rules for campaign financing were established. While the public financing of elections was increased, private sources were limited to a maximum of 10% of the total campaign expenses. Third, and most importantly, the Federal Electoral Institute (*Instituto Federal Electoral*, IFE) was restructured to be autonomously organized by citizen advisors in order to eliminate political intervention and was delegated further authority in administering and monitoring the federal-level elections⁷⁾. These new rules for fair electoral contests have reduced the uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes and, as discussed below, facilitated electoral coordination among voters in 2000⁸⁾.

2 Electoral Results in the 2000 Federal Elections

Under the new institutional setting, the federal elections were con-

ducted on July 2, 2000. The distinctive features of this pivotal election are summarized as follows⁹⁾. First, although opinion polls had forecasted a tie in the presidential election, Fox recorded an undisputed victory by defeating Labastida by a margin of 6.4 percentage points (Klesner 2002 : 144). As shown in Table 1, Fox won 42.5% of the votes ; Labastida, 36.1% ; and

Table 1. Results of the 2000 Federal Elections

	AC	PRI	AM	PCD	PARM	PDS
President	15,989,636 (42.5%)	13,579,718 (36.1%)	6,256,780 (16.6%)	206,589 (0.6%)	156,896 (0.4%)	592,381 (1.6%)
Deputies	14,212,032 (38.3%)	13,722,188 (36.9%)	6,942,844 (18.7%)	427,233 (1.2%)	271,781 (0.7%)	698,904 (1.9%)
Senators	14,198,073 (38.1%)	13,694,003 (36.8%)	7,024,374 (18.9%)	518,744 (1.4%)	274,352 (0.7%)	669,724 (1.8%)

Note : PCD represents the Democratic Center Party (*Partido del Centro Democrático*). PARM denotes the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (*Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana*). PDS refers to the Social Democratic Party (*Partido por la Democracia Social*). The results for deputies and Senators refer to the elections by the relative majority rule.

Source : Instituto Federal Electoral.

**Table 2. Changes in Vote Share by PAN, PRI, and PRD
in the Presidential Elections**

	1988		1994		2000	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
PAN	328,584	17.0	9,146,841	25.9	15,989,636	42.5
PRI	9,687,926	51.2	17,181,651	48.7	13,579,718	36.1
PRD	5,843,679	30.9	5,852,134	16.6	6,256,780	16.6

Note : Because the PAN formed an electoral coalition with a smaller party in 2000, the vote share of the PAN in 2000 corresponds to that of the AC. Likewise, the vote share of the PRD in 2000 refers to that of the AM.

Source : Instituto Federal Electoral.

Cárdenas, 16.6%¹⁰). As compared with the presidential elections in 1988 and 1994, the PAN increased its total votes by about six million in each election, whereas the PRI lost about four million votes in the past six years (Table 2). With respect to the PRD, while its total votes remained unchanged, its vote share declined by 13 percentage points between 1988 and 1994.

Second, no party or coalition gained the majority status in the lower house. More specifically, in the legislative election for deputies, the vote share of the three major parties was 38.3%, 36.9%, and 18.7% for the AC, AM, and PRI, respectively. As compared with the presidential election, the vote share of the PRI was almost the same, whereas the shares of the AC decreased by 4.2% and the PRD increased by 2.1%. This discrepancy suggests that some voters differentiated their party preferences between the presidential and legislative elections ; in other words, they split their tickets. As a result, in the lower house, the AC won 223 seats (PAN 206 and PVEM 17) ; the PRI, 211 seats ; and the AM, 66 seats (the PRD won 50 and its coalition partners 16). Since the opposition's share of seats exceeded that of the AC, the 2000 elections led to a divided government.

Third, the AC won in the regions where it had traditionally been weak. In 1994, at the state level, the PRI's presidential candidates triumphed in all 32 states in Mexico. However, in 2000, Fox won in 20 of the 32 states, Labastida won in 11 states, and Cárdenas in only one state. Remarkably, the AC won in the states of Veracruz and Puebla, where the PRI was traditionally strong (Klesner 2002 : 146). At the district level, the AC won in 142 districts, the PRI in 131 districts, and the AM in 27 districts¹¹). Watanabe demonstrates that the AC not only won in the districts where the PAN controlled the state governments but also where the PRI won in the midterm election in 1997 (Watanabe 2002 : 13). Such evidence suggests that the AC successfully garnered new support.

Finally, although the average turnout was 65%, the AC won in the states with high participation rates such as Yucatan (72%), the Federal District (71%), Queretaro (70%), Jalisco (68%), and the State of Mexico (68%). Conversely, the PRI won in the states with low participation rates such as Durango (58%), Baja California Sur (58%), Guerrero (54%), and Chiapas (52%). Chappell Lawson notes the following in this regard : “whereas higher turnout used to be correlated with higher level of PRI support, but the mid-1990s, the reverse was true.....PAN voters participated more and PRI voters less” (Lawson 2004 : 15). This high participation rate in the states where the AC won might be a consequence of electoral reforms, which assured free and fair elections, enhanced the participation of opposition parties, and offered a greater number of viable candidates for voters (Lawson and Klesner 2004 : 73).

As stated thus far, relative to the past election results, the 2000 federal elections exhibited distinctive voting patterns under the new institutional setting. Most importantly, while Fox defeated Labastida by a margin of 6.4 percentage points in the presidential election, the AC won the legislative election by only a bare majority with a margin of 1.4 percentage points. The next section examines the theoretical frameworks used to explain the cause of the unprecedented phenomenon of split-ticket voting.

II Split-Ticket Voting and Electoral Coordination in Democratizing Mexico

The aforementioned discrepancy in the vote shares of the three major parties or coalitions between the presidential and legislative elections suggests that the two million people who voted for the PRD candidates to the legislative offices chose Fox as the president (Hellman 2000 : 4). This raises the question as to why the same extent of shift in votes for the PAN or AC did not occur in the legislative election. The PRD supporters had a strong de-

sire for ousting the long-lasting PRI dominance. If they had considered Fox a more reliable leader to bring about “change,” they could have voted for his party or coalition candidate in the concurrent legislative election as well. Why did this not happen in reality?

There is a great deal of literature on split-ticket voting in the United States, and the debate has revolved around whether split-ticket voting is generated by intentional and strategic voting. First, the traditional account does not assume strategic voting and recognizes the increasing importance of ticket splitting as the unintentional byproduct of exogenous factors (Burden and Kimball 1998 : 533), such as the decline of partisanship and increased attention to the personality of candidates (Maddox and Nimmo 1981), campaign strategies involving the mass media to a greater extent (De Vries and Tarrance 1972), and simply the fact that presidential and congressional elections are held separately (Mattei and Howes 2000). The second perspective argues that voters intend to split their tickets for the purpose of policy balancing to avoid the policy extremism of the Democratic and Republican parties (Fiorina 1996). The voters are assumed to be intentional, but a divided government is not expected to be an outcome of strategic coordination. Third, the most recent studies claim that a divided government is intentionally generated to achieve policy moderation through strategic coordination among voters (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996 ; Mebane 2000).

Thus, the previous works on split-ticket voting differ on the assumption of intentional and strategic voting. As argued below, there are compelling reasons to believe that while a segment of Mexican voters split their tickets strategically, it is unlikely that they intended to divide the government for policy moderation. Unlike the case of the United States, such policy coordination might not be a plausible inducement to split-ticket voting in Mexico.

According to Walter Mebane, policy coordination can occur when the

following assumptions are met. First, a voter needs to be aware that “policy outcomes are compromises between the position taken by the president and Congress” and to believe that “the two political parties push for distinct policy alternatives.” Second, the voter is assumed to believe that a “different combination of party control of the presidency and Congress will produce different policy outcomes.” Some of the voters would “do best to split their ticket to try to bring about ‘moderate’ policy outcome, that is, an outcome in some sense between the parties’ positions” (Mebane 2000 : 37, emphasis in original). However, these assumptions were not relevant to the 2000 elections in Mexico for the following reasons.

First, the separation of powers, which generates “checks and balances” between different branches of government to achieve policy moderation (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996 : 44), was not as clear as in the United States. Despite the constitutional stipulation of the separation of powers, the PRI and the strong leadership of the presidents elected from the PRI had established a one-party dominant regime in Mexico for over 70 years, which generated the *de facto* fusion of the executive and legislative authorities. Furthermore, the lack of experience of the opposition parties in government would make it difficult for voters to predict the policy outcome in case the opposition wins the election and controls either branch of the government (Klesner 2004 : 113).

Second, a clear understanding of parties’ policy positions is a prerequisite for policy moderation ; however, this was not plausible in Mexico, at least in 2000. The policy positions of the presidential candidates were particularly less distinguishable in the 2000 elections. All the three candidates promised their commitment to economic growth, education, and public safety (Klesner 2002 : 143 ; Wallis 2001 : 313-314)¹²⁾. This was because, as indicated by a survey conducted four months prior to the election, these is-

sues were the major concerns among voters (Table 3). Instead, a cleavage was created over an issue concerning the regime, that is, the division between pro- and anti-regime camps (Hellman 2000 : 2 ; Klesner 2002 : 143). More specifically, Fox and Cárdenas made a strong commitment to “change” from the PRI’s regime, which had monopolized political power for over 70

Table 3 : Survey on Voters’ Priority Issues in 2000

“What is the most important problem in the county today?”

Public security	21%
Economy	19%
Poverty	12%
Unemployment	9%
Corruption	8%

Source : Camp, 2004., p. 37.

Table 4. Reasons for Voting Decision

Reason	Respondents (%)
For change	43
For the candidate	9
By obligation	2
By custom	7
The least bad	4
For party loyalty	5
For his proposals	22
Other	6
Don’t know	2
	100

Source : *Reforma*, July 3, 2000.

years. As Table 4 shows, a large segment of the voters considered “change” as a decisive factor in their voting decision in the absence of substantial policy debates.

Thus, the ambiguous separation of powers and the absence of policy debates made it highly unlikely that the voters differentiated their vote choice between the presidency and legislature for the purpose of policy coordination. What, then, explains split-ticket voting in Mexico? I argue that strategic voting occurred in the 2000 elections not for policy coordination but for electoral coordination. As stated earlier, the institutional and electoral reforms made the electoral outcome more predictable and thus lowered the degree of uncertainty attached to the electoral outcome, which in turn facilitated electoral coordination. More specifically, the reform activated electoral campaigns, opinion polls, and the mass media ; this had a substantial impact on the voting decisions by influencing voters’ preferences for their candidates, the beliefs on the preferences of other voters, and the expectations on the likely outcome of the election.

On the one hand, the mass media and electoral campaigns influenced vote choice in the following manner. As stated above, in the 2000 elections, the debate among the presidential candidates converged on the regime issue, and both the opposition candidates—Fox and Cárdenas—made a strong commitment to effect a “change” from the dominance of the PRI¹³). However, there was no coordination at the elite level because the PAN and PRD failed to form an anti-regime coalition to win the election. Instead, strategic coordination occurred at the mass level (Magaloni and Poiré 2004). As mentioned earlier, the two million people who voted for the PRD candidates for the legislative offices chose Fox as president (Hellman 2000 : 4). This suggests that a portion of the PRD supporters, who wanted to overthrow the PRI and were able to process information to the effect that Cárdenas had only a slight

chance to win the presidency, voted for Fox in the presidential election. This vote choice was affected by Fox's skillful campaign involving the extensive use of the media to impress voters with his strong commitment to "change."¹⁴ In other words, Fox successfully coordinated the expectation among the opposition supporters by convincing them that voting for him would make a difference.

On the other hand, opinion polls played an increasingly important role in helping voters form preferences for their candidates, beliefs on other voter's preferences, and expectations on each candidate's performance on the election day (Cox 1997 : 74). During the electoral process, various opinion poll companies visualized how the contest would evolve and generated a perception of which candidates were performing well (Grupo Financiero Banamex - Accival 2000 : 263)¹⁵. In the last month of the pre-election campaign, various opinion polls suggested that the presidential contest would result in a tie between Fox and Labastida (Klesner 2002 : 144). The information on the close race generated an additional incentive to cast a useful vote because the "tie" strengthened voters' perceptions that "your vote will be decisive."

Particularly, Fox succeeded in gaining support from "undecided" voters by emphasizing the importance of their vote in order to break the tie in his campaign messages. According to a post-electoral survey, 19% of the electorate did not make their voting decision until the very last minute¹⁶. To attract these decisive "undecided" voters and break the "tie," Fox repeatedly displayed his firm confidence in victory to convince the Mexicans that their vote would make a difference (Schedler 2000 : 11). According to Hellman, an overwhelming portion of these "undecided" were former PRD voters and millions of Mexicans affiliated with unions and associations that were tied to the PRI (Hellman 2000 : 3). They included a number of high-profile intellectuals of the left PRD supporters, who were supposedly disappointed with

Cárdenas and therefore cast a “useful vote” for Fox. Consequently, among the “undecided,” 47% voted for Fox, 34% for Labastida, and 17% for Cárdenas (Grupo Financiero Banamex – Accival 2000 : 265).

In short, the institutional and electoral reforms enhanced the role of the mass media, electoral campaign, and opinion polls to shape voters’ preferences, beliefs, and expectations on the electoral outcome, by reducing the degree of uncertainty. This induced the anti-regime voters, particularly high-profile PRD supporters, to split their tickets and strategically vote for Fox in the presidential election. By contrast, they were not given the incentive to cast another “useful vote” for the AC in the legislative elections. Fox could solve the problem of coordinating those opposition voters’ expectations by undertaking a skillful campaign for the presidential election. However, the campaign promise for “change” narrowly focused on his personal leadership skill and did not emphasize that his party and coalition would also be capable of accomplishing the objective in the legislative arena. Accordingly, it failed to mobilize support for the AC’s success in the legislative election to the same extent as in the presidential election. In other words, Fox induced a portion of the PRD supporters to *strategically* vote for him in the presidential election, but the impetus was not sufficiently effective to change their *sincere* preference, which could have led to a victory across the board for the AC and the emergence of a PAN-led unified government in the coming administration. Thus, split-ticket voting and a divided government are considered to be unintended consequences of electoral coordination in the presidential election.

Drawing on the expectations outlined above, it is hypothesized that plausible ticket splitters who enabled electoral coordination in the presidential election had an attachment to the PRD, a preference for change from the PRI, and a relatively higher socioeconomic status. Thus, three testable hy-

potheses are presented as follows :

Hypothesis 1 : Ticket splitters were more likely to be traditional supporters of the PRD.

Hypothesis 2 : The more the voters suffered from the unfavorable government performance, the more likely were they to split their tickets because they had a greater incentive toward change from the status quo and the more susceptible were they to Fox's campaign message.

Hypothesis 3 : The higher the voter's socioeconomic status, the more likely were they to split their tickets because they had the ability to process the information required for electoral coordination.

III Research Design and Model Specification

Testing the above hypotheses requires national survey data on ticket splitters ; however, such data was unavailable for this research. Therefore, this study analyzes cross-sectional data on electoral results and socioeconomic attributes by district for the year 2000, to examine the effects of district characteristics on the probability of split-ticket voting¹⁷⁾. This would be an approximate estimation of the motivation behind ticket splitting. The unit of analysis is the district. The data set includes 285 out of 300 observations for which data are available, representing a good cross section within the country.¹⁸⁾ Since I use the cross-sectional data for 285 cases, heteroskedasticity becomes an issue of concern. In order to determine if the estimates are biased and inconsistent, I use two estimators—the ordinary least square (OLS) and the weighted least square (WLS)—and then compare the coefficients and significance. A basic formulation of the regression models is pre-

sented as follows :

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{FOX}_i - \text{AC}_i) / \text{Vote total}_i \\ = & \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{PRD97} + \beta_2 \text{Crime} + \beta_3 \text{Growth} + \beta_4 \text{Marginality} + \\ & \beta_5 \text{PRD97} * \text{Marginality} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

where $(\text{FOX}_i - \text{AC}_i) / \text{Vote total}_i$ is the dependent variable ; $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4,$ and $\beta_5,$ are the estimated parameters ; i refers to a district as a cross-sectional unit ; γ_i refers to state dummy variables that control for region-specific effects for each of the 32 states in Mexico ; and ε_i is an error term. The detailed variable descriptions are presented below.

1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable— $(\text{FOX}_i - \text{AC}_i) / \text{Vote total}_i$ —denotes a difference of the vote share between the presidential candidate of the AC, Fox, and the candidate of the AC for the lower house election in district i . The data are drawn from the electoral results published by the IFE. Conceptually, the variable to be explained is discrete because voters make a binary choice among alternative candidates. Since this analysis uses the data aggregated at the district level, I obtain the probability of ticket splitting, which falls between zero and one, by dividing the vote difference between Fox and the legislative candidates by the total votes of each district. For calculating the ratio of split-ticket voting, Watanabe (2002) uses the total votes of Fox as a denominator. However, since this includes the effects of the strength of Fox in the district, this study uses the total votes in each district instead. In a strict sense, the total votes in the presidential election are slightly larger than that in the legislative election in each district. As the difference is sufficiently small so as not to affect the estimates, the larger total votes in the

presidential election is used as a denominator.

2 Independent Variables

To test the hypotheses, this study includes five independent variables. In the previous section, plausible split-ticket voters are identified as those who are traditional supporters of the PRD, hoping for a change from the PRI government, and who enjoy a higher socioeconomic status. First, the voter's partisanship may be inferred from his or her past voting pattern in a district. More specifically, the electoral results of the PRD in the 1997 midterm election should be a good predictor for the party's strength in each district. The variable *PRD 97* draws on the official electoral results published by the IFE and is calculated by dividing the total votes of the PRD candidate by the total votes in each district.

Second, the magnitude of voters' preference for a change from the PRI regime is measured by the current government performance. In particular, given that the economy and public security are high priority issues as demonstrated in Table 3, the effects of these variables on the probability of ticket-splitting should be examined. *Crime* denotes the increase in the crime rate and *Growth* denotes the GDP growth rate, drawing on the *XII Censo General Población y Vivienda 2000* published by the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática*, INEGI)¹⁹. For these two variables, the average values during the period between 1997 and 2000 at the state level are used. This is because in 1997, the midterm elections reshuffled the government composition, and the voting decision would have been affected by the performance of the administration during this period. With regard to the observation unit, state-level data are used because the data at the district level are not available.

Third, a higher socioeconomic status is an important predictor of electoral coordination because it is associated with higher accessibility to information from various sources and the capability to process it. For this variable, this analysis uses the marginality index, represented as *Marginality*, instead of employing multiple socioeconomic indicators such as the level of education and housing conditions. The marginality index is a composite measure calculated by the CONAPO (*Consejo Nacional de Población*). More specifically, it is constructed by using the method of principal components based on the following seven variables: the share of (1) illiterate population aged 15 or more, (2) dwellings without running water, (3) household dwellings without drainage, (4) household dwellings without electricity, (5) dwellings with earthen floors, (6) the average number of occupants per room, and (7) the percentage of labor force working in the agricultural sector. The merits of using this index are two-fold. First, this single measure can capture both voter's accessibility to information and their capacity to process it, which would predict strategic voting. Second, it can avoid the problem of multicollinearity, which arises with the use of highly correlated variables, such as the education level and living conditions in Mexico. It should be noted that a higher marginality index corresponds to a lower socioeconomic status.

Finally, I also include the interaction term—*PRD 97*Marginality*—in order to observe how support for the PRD and higher socioeconomic status jointly determine the probability of split-ticket voting. As argued in the previous section, I hypothesize that the probability of split-ticket voting increases if voters are PRD supporters, are unsatisfied with the unfavorable government performance, and have a higher socioeconomic status. Thus, I expect to see a positive and significant coefficient on *PRD 97* and *Crime* and a negative and significant coefficient on *Growth*, *Marginality*, and the inter-

action term.

IV Results and Interpretation

Table 5 presents the OLS and WLS regression results. A comparison of these results suggests that the OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent because the magnitude of the coefficients and standard errors differs between these two estimators and some variables turn out to be statistically significant in the WLS estimator. These differences are attributable to the heteroskedasticity in the OLS estimates. Thus, the WLS estimates are considered for this analysis. The major findings are presented as follows.

First, the coefficient for *PRD 97* is positive and statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level. This suggests that split-ticket voters are more likely to be traditional supporters of the PRD, which supports *Hypothesis 1*. Second, the effects of government performances depict mixed results. While the estimated coefficient of *Crime* is positive and statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level, that of *Growth* is negative but not statistically significant. As stated above, the increase in crime rate and lower growth rate are expected to generate a greater incentive to vote for change and thus be more susceptible to Fox's campaign messages. In the light of this, the coefficients of these variables yield an expected sign, but the effect of crime is more discernible. Given that the voters perceived that public security was the first priority followed by the economy, as described in Table 3, these results might not be inconsistent with the theoretical predictions, and thus, *Hypothesis 2* cannot be rejected. Third, the effect of *Marginality* is negative and not statistically significant. This can be interpreted as the fact that the socioeconomic status alone does not predict the probability of split-ticket voting. Nevertheless, when this variable is interacted with *PRD 97*, it becomes statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level, with a coefficient having a negative sign. This im-

plies that in a district with a higher socioeconomic status (lower marginality index), split-ticket voting was more likely to occur if it was a traditional support base of the PRD. Thus, *Hypothesis 3* is conditionally supported.

In sum, all three hypotheses are supported by the results of the empirical estimation. The findings are summarized as follows. First, split-ticket voters had a partisan attachment to the PRD. Second, voters split their tickets because they wished for a “change” from the PRI dominance, which exhibited the unfavorable government performance, particularly the increasing

Table 5. OLS and WLS Regression Results for Split-Ticket Voting

Variables	OLS	WLS
PRD 97	.15013** (.02802)	.15559** (.02766)
Crime	-.00033 (.00024)	.00064* (.0003)
Growth	.00124 (.00213)	-.0027 (.00189)
Marginality	-.00603 (.00521)	-.00403 (.00612)
PRD 97*Marginality	-.03277 (.0201)	-.05264* (.02188)
Constant	.04488** (.01995)	.0629** (.01712)
F	9.18**	10.62**
Adjusted R^2	.495	.535
N	285	285

Note: Cell entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, two tailed test. State dummy variables for 32 states were included in the models, but the coefficients are not reported here.

crime rates. Third, the socioeconomic status of voters matters on the condition that they were supporters of the PRD. These findings confirm that the traditional PRD voters who had a higher socioeconomic status and hoped for “change” cast a vote strategically for Fox in the presidential election and sincerely for a candidate of the PRD in the lower house election. Thus, electoral coordination that occurred in the presidential election explains the split-ticket voting and the divided government in the 2000 federal elections in Mexico.

Conclusion

This paper argues that split-ticket voting occurred as a result of electoral coordination among a segment of the PRD supporters in the 2000 federal elections in Mexico, leading to a divided government. In the Mexican case, it was *not* policy coordination *but* electoral coordination in the presidential election that generated this unintended outcome. More specifically, the unambiguous separation of powers and unclear policy platforms of the candidates made policy coordination implausible. By contrast, a series of institutional and electoral reforms reduced the degree of uncertainty attached to electoral outcomes and thus facilitated electoral coordination in the presidential election. The empirical analysis using aggregate data demonstrates that voters who had an attachment to the PRD, a preference for a “change” from the PRI, and who enjoyed a higher socioeconomic status cast a “useful vote” for Fox in the presidential election and sincerely voted for the PRD candidate in the legislative election. This study is a modest effort to estimate the motivation behind this unprecedented phenomenon. However, it also clarifies a number of remaining questions that should be addressed in order to improve the arguments.

First, in order to provide a clearer explanation of electoral coordination,

the preferences, beliefs, and expectations regarding the electoral outcomes of each split-ticket voter need to be investigated using individual-level data. Otherwise, it is impossible to accurately examine how voters' choices are coordinated based on common knowledge and information regarding the outcomes. For instance, a post-electoral survey for the 2003 midterm election incorporated a questionnaire items directly inquiring about a preference for a divided government²⁰). Additional survey researches of the presidential elections will provide opportunities to analyze voters' intention to split tickets.

Second, despite the lack of micro-level data, there remains the possibility that voters divided the government for policy moderation. Given that the 2000 elections were a "pivotal democratic election" in Mexico's political history and a departure from the authoritarian past, it would be reasonable to assume that Mexican voters "brought a double insurance policy—against renewed authoritarian lordship and against wild policy implementation" (Domínguez 2004 : 341). Further evidence should be collected in order to examine whether this statement can be generalized.

Despite these questions, this study has important implications for split-ticket voting and divided government in emerging democracies, which has not been studied thus far. The importance should be emphasized given that such differential voting prevailed to a greater extent in the 2006 federal elections in Mexico and seems to have become a normal practice among Mexican voters. In this sense, an increased effort should be made to explain this emerging phenomenon and to build a theory on it.

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** Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University. E-mail : ytakahashi@people.kobe-u.ac.jp

Notes

- 1) An exception is Watanabe (2002). He regards split-ticket voting as a decisive factor in Fox's victory.
- 2) More technically, Mebane explains that "coordination occurs 'if each voter's choice is in a strategic sense in equilibrium with every other voter's choice' " (Mebane 2000 : 37).
- 3) Specifically, electoral coordination assumes strategic voting with which voters "abandon their sincere choice — a trailing candidate — for one of the front-runners in order not to waste their vote" (Magaloni and Poiré 2004 : 276).
- 4) According to Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, reasoned choice does not require complete information but knowledge, defined as "the ability to predict the consequences of actions" (Lupia and McCubbins 1998 : 6).
- 5) In January 1994, an armed insurgence erupted in Chiapas, and the PRI's presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated during the electoral campaign in March.
- 6) This brief summary of the electoral and party systems in Latin American countries draws on Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and Klesner (2002).
- 7) For the electoral reforms in 1996, see Becerra, Salazar, and Woldenberg (1997) and Klesner (2002).
- 8) According to Klesner and Lawson, this effect is more salient among the opposition and unaffiliated voters because the reforms further convinced them that their participation might be decisive to the electoral results (Klesner and Lawson 2001). As evidence to this fact, they demonstrated a higher turnout among these voters, who were more politically engaged than the traditional PRI supporters.
- 9) This section on the election results relies largely on the election results published by the IFE and Klesner (2002).
- 10) According to Klesner, the remaining votes were accounted for by three other

candidates (Klesner 2002 : 144).

- 11) Mexico is divided into 300 electoral districts that serve as a base for the election of the lower house by the relative majority formula.
- 12) However, these candidates differed with regard to the specific development strategy to be implemented. According to Klesner, while Fox and Labastida insisted on continuing the market-based strategy, Cárdenas rejected the neo-liberal economic strategy, which had been pursued in Mexico since the 1980s (Klesner 2002 : 143).
- 13) The salience of a pro- versus anti-regime cleavage in the 2000 elections is extensively discussed in Klesner (2004).
- 14) In addition, Hernández (2000), Wallis (2001), and Watanabe (2002) point out the “Americanization” of the campaign, namely, the salience of negative campaign, as one of the features of the 2000 elections.
- 15) In the month preceding the election, as many as thirteen companies published the results of the national opinion polls separately (Grupo Financiero Banamex - Accival 2000 : 264).
- 16) This survey draws on *Reforma*, July 3, 2000.
- 17) Although the use of aggregate data may lead to the problem of ecological fallacy, Klesner emphasizes the merit that “aggregate-level data can tell us in which kinds of places a particular party tends to perform well or poorly” (Klesner 2004 : 102).
- 18) While Mexico City is divided into thirty districts, most of the other districts consist of several municipalities. In order to compare the socioeconomic attributes of each district, I employ data on the municipality representing all the districts, except Mexico City because socioeconomic data aggregated at the district level are not available. Further elaboration of this measure is an agenda for future research.
- 19) The data for crime rate only includes the reported cases. Given that many of the incidences are not reported, it is likely that the effect of this variable is underestimated.
- 20) This survey was conducted by *Reforma*, July 26, 2003.

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